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ABSTRACT

Commentators have observed two apparent trends in the use of legal scholarship
by the judiciary. First,judges now cite law review articles in their opinions with less
frequency. Second, despite this general decline in the invocation of legal scholarship,
judges now cite articlesin specialtyjournals with morefrequency.
Some commentators attribute the apparent decline in the courts' use of legal
scholarship to the increasingly theoretical and impractical nature of that scholarship.
Afew studies even suggest that the increasinguse of specialtyjournals by the courts
reflects the gap between the content of legal scholarshipin general law reviews and the
practical needs of the judiciary. Others defend the academy, taking the position that
academics continue to write meaningful doctrinal articles and that theoretical and
interdisciplinarypieces encourage broaderintellectual discourse regardinglegal issues.
The study underlying this article analyzes and counters the claim of the
diminishing role of legal scholarship in the context of business law cases. Specfically,
the studyfocuses on the use of legal scholarshipby Delaware state courtsfrom 1997 to
2007, as well as on an interval basis dating back to 1965. The study detects no
general downward trend in the use of legal scholarship in business law cases.
Moreover, the study undertakes a detailed analysis of factors predicting a court's
likelihood to cite legal scholarship. Overall, the study provides a unique insight into
when, why, and how courts invoke legal scholarship in business law cases and,
consequently, may help informfuture scholarship intended to influence court decisions
in this discipline.
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INTRODUCTION

Does legal scholarship matter outside of the academy? The answer to
this question may in part depend on whom you ask. Some commentators
assert that legal scholarship is too theoretical or impractical and,
consequently, adds little value from the perspective of the general legal
profession.'
Others defend the academy, taking the position that
academics continue to write meaningful doctrinal articles and that
theoretical and interdisciplinary pieces encourage broader intellectual
discourse regarding legal issues.'
The debate has, for the most part, concentrated on articles published
in the "elite" law reviews and citation counts in opinions issued by the
United States Supreme Court or the federal courts generally? Several
studies suggest that courts now cite law review articles in their opinions
with less frequency.' At least two studies find that, despite this general
decline in the invocation of legal scholarship, judges cite articles in
specialty journals with more frequency.'
Many studies attribute the
decline in judicial citation counts to the increasingly impractical nature of
legal scholarship.'
We take a different approach in the study underlying this article. We
concentrate on a legal discipline in which academics may choose to write
I

See infra Part II.

See infra Part II.
For example, Judge Harry Edwards argued that "many law schools-especially the socalled 'elite' ones-have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense
of practical scholarship and pedagogy." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992). Studies tend to use the term "elite"
law schools or law reviews to refer to schools or reviews consistently placed in the top ten of one or
more of the various rankings. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme
Court: 1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1110-11 (2000). See also infra Part II.
4
See infra Part II.
s
See Robert M. Lawless & Ira David, The General Role Played by Specialty Law journals:
EmpiricalEvidencefrom Bankruptcy Scholarship, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 523, 24 (2006); Cardozo Law Review
Staffers, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Roundtable Discussion, Trends in FederalJudicial
Citations and Law Review Articles, (Mar. 8, 2007), http//graphics8.nytimes.corn/packages/pdf/nationaV
20070319_federalcitations.pdf.
6
See e.g., David I. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal
Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssm.com-x/abstract= 1640681 (explaining criticism of academic scholarship and the dismissive
attitude of some judges and practitioners towards such scholarship) (collecting sources); Edwards,
supra note 3, at 36 ("[T]oo few law professors are producing articles or treatises that have direct utility
for judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners, too many important social issues are resolved
without the needed input from academic lawyers."); see also infra Part II.
2
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for judges or practitioners and can target a relatively small, specialized
judiciary. Specifically, we focus on the use of legal scholarship by
Delaware state courts and consider not only academic articles but also
other types of academic scholarship that judges and practitioners might
invoke.'
Our primary hypothesis is that the courts' use of legal
scholarship in the business law context is less susceptible to the ebb and
flow found in general judicial citation studies.
Although the scope of our study is limited, the data analyses have
broader implications.' For example, the data suggest that there are
exceptions to the generalized findings of other authoritative studies, and
the utility of legal scholarship may depend on the targeted audience and
legal issues in controversy.' The data also suggest that, regardless of the
number of judicial citations, courts do rely on legal scholarship when it
counts most-when they are facing complex or novel legal issues.'o
Consequently, academics still play a critical role in the development and
application of the law.
Part I of this article summarizes the primary hypothesis and key data
analyses in our study. Part II provides historical context for our
hypothesis and its contribution to the larger debate concerning the utility
of legal scholarship for the judiciary and practitioners. Part III explains
our methodology and the components of our study. Part IV then analyzes
the data using a variety of statistical tools, including multiple regression
analysis to identify factors predicting the extent and nature of scholarship
use. Part V offers general observations regarding the data and analyses.
The article concludes by noting the continued role for legal scholarship in
judicial opinions and encourages additional research on means to
strengthen that role.

The study uses Delaware state court decisions because Delaware is a key jurisdiction in the
development of corporate law and is the state of incorporation for a majority of U.S. companies. See,
e.g., Lawrence Hamermesh, How We Make Law in Delaware, and What to Expectfrom Us in the Future, 2J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 409, 10 (2007) ("Delaware certainly does 'prescribe' and 'interpret' national
corporate policy, and has done so for quite a long time."); see also MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 593-96 (2003) ("Delaware also has a specialized, highly regarded judiciary,
acting without a jury. The judges take pride in keeping up with business trends, having good business
sense, knowing their own limits, and reacting quickly as professionals.") (discussing the status of
Delaware in context of state corporate law).
8
See ifa Part V.
9
See infra Part IV.
10
See infra Part IV.B.
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I. SUMMARY OF STUDY AND KEY DATA ANALYSES

We designed our study to evaluate two key questions: how courts use
legal scholarship in their judicial opinions addressing business law issues,
and whether their use of scholarship in this context has changed over
time. The study itself involved three separate but related components.
First, we conducted an extensive review of 200 business law decisions
rendered by the Delaware state courts from 1997-2007.11 Second, we
supplemented this ten-year review with an additional 157 cases pulled
from two-year intervals dating back to 1965. We used this second
component of the study to assess the general claim discussed above; that
judicial use of scholarship has declined in recent years. Finally, we
administered a written survey regarding the use of legal scholarship in
judicial opinions to judges currently serving on the Delaware state bench.
The results of the survey complement the data collected from the courts'
dockets.
The data suggest that, contrary to the more general trend, the
Delaware state courts' use of legal scholarship in the business law context
has not changed significantly during the past forty years.' 2 This same
result emerged in a more focused analysis of the courts' use of only
traditional academic scholarship during that period." The data also
highlight some interesting trends with respect to legal scholarship. For
example, the Delaware state courts' percentage use of academic, nondoctrinal articles in judicial opinions increased significantly during 2006
and 2007.14 Similarly, we noted a significant trend in the courts'
percentage citation of academic authors. For example, in 2004, 2005,
2006, and 2007, the courts were more likely to cite academic authors,
while in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, the courts were more likely to cite
practitioner authors."s
Regarding the type of publication, treatises are cited most frequently,
particularly within rulings on motions for summary judgment and
opinions after trial.'6 As noted above, we also analyze courts' use of more
traditional academic publications, such as general university law reviews
and specialized university law reviews. The data suggest that general

"
12
13

14

1s
16

For a more detailed description of methodology, see infra Part UH.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infia Part IV.D.
See infra Part IV.B3.
See infa Part IV.B.4.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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university law reviews are cited significantly more frequently when there
is a motion to dismiss as compared to all other publication types."
The overall data did not show a significant preference for specialty law
reviews over more general law reviews.'8 Nevertheless, all fifteen
specialized university law review citations stemmed from opinions
focused on corporate governance (internal affairs) issues." These issues
typically involve more complicated fact patterns and may be sensitive to
outside developments, such as the Enron and Worldcom corporate
scandals that were uncovered during the period of the core study.20 This
result also corresponds to a response submitted by one of the Delaware
judges to the judges' survey, who indicated that he or she finds articles
published by specialized university law reviews more useful than those
published by general law reviews because the "[d]iscussion is more in
depth and relevant to emerging issues."21
Our study not only contradicts the more general citation trends in the
context of business law cases, but it also goes further than prior studies
and provides a detailed analysis of factors influencing the use of legal
scholarship by courts. Specifically, the data analyze a number of factors
that might predict a court's use of scholarship, including the identity and
number of parties involved in the litigation, the type of pleading, the
causes of action asserted in the pleadings and the outcome of the dispute.
The data confirm, in many respects, anecdotal evidence and general
intuition. For example, the data show that the courts invoke legal
scholarship in complex litigation involving a greater number of parties and
cases seeking resolution prior to trial (e.g., at the motion to dismiss or
summary judgment stage).' In addition, the general preference of the
opinion writer weighs heavily in the decision to cite scholarship.'
Our general conclusions are supplemented by the results of a written
survey soliciting the perspective of judges currently serving on the
Delaware state bench. The survey data confirm that the decision to cite
scholarship is largely based on the preferences of the individual judge; no
17
18

See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.E2.

See infra Part M.B2.
See, e.g., Ann M. Scarlett, Confision and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation:
The Delaware Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FIA. L. REv. 589, 590-95 (2008)
(describing perceived changes in courts' evaluation of shareholder derivative litigation after corporate
scandals like Enron and WorldCom).
21
See infra Part V.
2
See infra Part IVA
2
See infr Part IVAla.
1
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one circumstance exists that would motivate all of the surveyed judges to
use scholarship. 24 The survey data also show that, even if judges do not
cite legal scholarship, they or their law clerks may, nevertheless, use
scholarship in researching issues raised in their cases. 25 This result
captures a utility of legal scholarship not susceptible to observation in the
data pulled from the courts' dockets (whether in this or other studies).
Moreover, although the surveyed judges note source reputation as the
primary factor in deciding whether to cite scholarship, results from the
core study suggest a secondary factor-tenure and reputation of the
author-weighs heavily in that decision.
In sum, our study offers a focused analysis of not only citation trends,
but also the circumstances affecting a court's decision to cite legal
scholarship in business law cases.26 This in-depth analysis of trends and
predictive factors distinguishes this study from prior studies. 27 The multilevel analysis also permits this study to make a meaningful contribution to
the general debate regarding the utility of legal scholarship. It suggests,
among other things, that scholars who desire to influence judicial
decisions may maximize their impact by focusing on controversial and
complex legal issues in their discipline-issues that go beyond the content
of general treatises, and really shape the future direction of the law. For
many scholars, this result dovetails nicely with the broader purpose of
academic scholarship.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR STUDIES

In 1992, Judge Harry Edwards sparked a lively and ongoing debate
regarding the utility of legal scholarship.28 Judge Edwards criticized the
increasingly impractical nature of legal scholarship and posited that, as a

See infra Part V.E.
See infra Part IV.E.
2
Admittedly, citation studies have their limitations. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 71 (The University of Chicago Press 1990) ("Citations are . . .
an imperfect proxy for reputation . . . ."); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Articles from The Yale Law
Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 85 (1991) ("[Rlanking by citation counts ... bears no relationship to
scholarly merit . .. It is not even a reliable indicator that the work cited was read, let alone understood
by the citer.") (citing commentary ofJoseph Goldstein); see also Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law
Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 751, 53 (1996).
2
See infra Part II.
28
See Edwards, supra note 3, at 34. For an excellent discussion of this debate and insightful
commentary on legal scholarship generally, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword. Why Write?, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 881 (2009).
24
5
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result, "judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use
for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the
academy."2 9 Notably, Judge Edwards did not suggest that theoretical or
impractical scholarship had no value; rather, he urged the integration of
doctrine and theory and questioned the quality of purely theoretical legal
scholarship.30
Not surprisingly, many commentators refuted Judge Edwards'
charges and defended the increasing use of theoretical and
interdisciplinary analysis in the academy."t For example, Lee Bollinger
argued that Judge Edwards' "diagnosis of a highly contagious and
debilitating disease of 'theory' in our major law schools, and of its
supposed effects, is seriously overdrawn--even to the point of being a
fundamental mischaracterization."3 2 In addition, although agreeing with
some of Judge Edwards' critiques, Judge Richard Posner expressed
concern regarding, among other things, "the production of legal
scholarship [that] is artificially encouraged by restrictions on entry into
the legal profession."63 He noted, "[p]erhaps the ultimate criterion of all
scholarship is utility, but it need not be utility to a particular audience."34
Even before Judge Edwards' 1992 article, several commentators
focused on the courts' perspective on, and use of, legal scholarship.35 For
example, in 1986, Louis Sirico and Jeffrey Margulies conducted a study of
the United States Supreme Court's use of legal scholarship in judicial
opinions during the 1971-73 and 1981-83 terms. 6 The data showed
several interesting trends, including an increasing decline in the Court's
citation of legal scholarship. Sirico then conducted a follow up study in
2000, adding the 1991-93 and 1996-98 terms, and reached the same

Id. at 35.
Id. at 35-36.
31
See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 884-86. For an interesting empirical study of the types
of articles cited by judges as compared to those cited by academics, which was conducted in part in
response to the critiques of Judge Edwards and others, see Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam,
judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly]ournalsCite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 871 (1996).
32
Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the MajorAmerican Iaw School, 91 MICH. L REv. 2167, 2168 (1993).
33
Richard A Posner, The DeprofessionalzationofLegal Training and Sdrolarship,91 MICH. L. REV. 1921,
1928 (1993).
3
Id.
3
See Sirico, supra note 3, at 1009 n.1 (identifying several studies conducted both before and after the
publication ofJudge Edwards' 1992 article).
36
See Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An
EmpirialStudy, 34 UCIA L. REV. 131 (1986).
9

0
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general conclusion regarding legal scholarship citations." This latter
study also evidenced a decline in the Court's reliance on articles from law
reviews generally regarded as elite.
In 1998, Michael McClintock surveyed the use of legal scholarship by
the United States Supreme Court, federal circuit courts of appeal, federal
district courts, and state supreme courts during 1975-76, 1985-86, and
1995-96." McClintock reached a conclusion similar to that of Sirico and
Margulies; he found a continuing decline in the courts' citation of legal
scholarship in opinions issued during the study period. Specifically,
"there was a 47.35% decrease in overall citations by the federal courts and
state supreme courts combined."39 Moreover, "[c]itations in the United
States Supreme Court, while increasing slightly in the 1980s, plummeted
65.0% over the next ten years for an overall decrease of 58.6% for the
twenty-year period."'
Most studies suggest an increase in judicial citations to legal
scholarship during the 1960s and 1970s then a significant decline in those
citations after the 1980s.41 Nevertheless, a 2010 study by David Schwartz
and Lee Petherbridge posits an increase in judicial use of legal scholarship
in the past twenty years.42 Although these studies frequently focus on the
United States Supreme Court or the federal courts, a few studies have
surveyed select state courts, typically state supreme courts.43 In addition, a
study by Robert Lawless and Ira David considered the contributions of
specialty journals to federal bankruptcy court decisions." Interestingly,
that study concluded that "not only do specialty journals outperform

3
See Sirico,supra note 3.
3
See Michael D. McClintock, The Dedining Use ofLegal Scholarship by Courts: An EmpiricalStudy, 51
OXIA L. REV. 659 (1998).
9
Id. at 684.
4
Id. at 684-85.
41
See McClintock, supra note 38; Sirico, supra note 3; Sirico & Margulies, supra note 36; Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra note 5.
42
See Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 6 ("Here the data provide evidence of a rather
surprising result: over the last 59 years-and particularly over the last 20 years-there has not been a
decline in the use of legal scholarship; rather, there has been a marked increase in the use of legal
scholarship in the reported opinions of the circuit courts of appeals.").
4
See, e.g., Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of
Appeals, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 126 (1998); Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A
Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981) (citation practices of sixteen state supreme
courts); William H. Manz, The CitationPractices ofthe New York Court ofAppeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF.
L. REV. 121 (1995); McClintock, supra note 38 (citation practices of, among others, state supreme
courts).
4
See Lawless & David, supra note 5.
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general law reviews overall [in bankruptcy court citations], but lowerranked general law reviews outperform law reviews from more highly
ranked law schools."4 5
General judicial citation studies are very useful in considering the big
picture and overall trends in judicial citation patterns. They are limited,
however, in their ability to distinguish between legal disciplines, the
complexity of the legal issues in controversy, and the preferences of
individual judges.4 6 All of these factors are important in the citation
pattern of a particular court. Our study attempts to account for some of
these factors in analyzing data and the resulting citation trends.47
Notably, our study does not purport to assess the optimal or even
preferred substance, style, or tone of legal scholarship that may be invoked
by the courts. Rather, it attempts to catalog, for purposes of objective
analysis of those topics, the types of legal scholarship used by courts in the
corporate context. The data provide an overview of when and how courts
rely on that scholarship. The data in turn may help corporate scholars in
future writings designed to influence decisional law.
III. OVERVIEW OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

Our primary hypothesis is that the Delaware state courts' use of legal
scholarship in business law cases is less susceptible to the ebb and flow
evidenced by general judicial citation studies. We based this hypothesis in
part on anecdotal evidence. For example, scholars writing about business
law issues often challenge or address legal doctrine that potentially
impacts both the boardroom and the courtroom. This is not to say that
corporate scholarship is purely doctrinal; it is not. Corporate scholarship
does, however, frequently tackle issues being addressed by the courts,
specifically the Delaware state courts.48 Moreover, members of the

4
46

Id.at 542.
In addition, our study uses a broader definition of scholarship than most prior studies. See infra
Part MA Nevertheless, to provide a more complete picture and permit some comparison with prior studies,
this article also analyzes individual types of scholarship (e.g., academic articles).
47
Our study is nonetheless subject to the same caveats applicable to most citation studies. For
example, we analyze citation counts and resulting trends; we did not attempt to measure the quality or merits
of any particular piece of scholarship. Moreover, because of the observational nature of our study, we may not
account for all confounding or relevant variables. For example, we could not quantify academic scholarship
read but not cited byjudges in their opinions. Butsee discussion ofjudges' survey infra Part IV.E.
4s
For examples of meaningful discussions by judges of scholarship addressing timely
corporate legal issues, see, for example, Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d
168, 195 n.75 (Del. Ch. 2006) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors'Fiduciary
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Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery tend to interact with
the academy, either by teaching, lecturing, or writing on corporate legal
issues.49 As described in further detail below, the data support our
primary hypothesis.
We conducted the study in three separate parts. First, we collected
data from Delaware state court decisions involving business law issues
during 1997-2007 (the "core study"). Second, we collected data to
analyze similar Delaware state court decisions over a forty year period by
sampling cases in two-year intervals dating to 1965 (the "interval study").
Finally, we administered a written survey to the judges presently serving
on the Delaware state bench (the "judges' survey"). Our methodology for
collecting and analyzing all data follows.
A. Methodologyfor Core and Interval Studies
To obtain a randomly selected sample of Delaware business law cases
in a ten year span, we used the Lexis Nexis Total Research System
Delaware Corporate Cases database."o One thousand six-hundred fiftyfive cases emerged from the selected time period of January 1, 1997 to
December 31, 2007. It should be noted that these are not likely 1,655
individual cases. Rather, cases reported at the trial court, appellate court,
and Delaware Supreme Court level all likely contribute.

Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 335 (2007)); see also Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,
771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that Delaware Supreme Court adopted term "substantive
coercion" from the article, Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 (1989)); Thomas L.
Ambro, Citing Legal Articles inJudicialOpinions: A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 547, 550
(2006) (Judge Ambro explains that he "felt [he] had found the Rosetta Stone" upon uncovering Mary
Elisabeth Kors' article Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITr. L. REV. 381
(1998)).
4
For example, Justice Jacobs serves as an Adjunct Professor of Law at the New York University
School of Law, at the Widener University School of Law and at the Columbia University School of Law, Vice
Chancellor Leo Strine participated as a moderator in the Chancery Court Program at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and as a speaker at the 2009 Association of American Law Schools Mid-Year
Meeting and Conference on Business Associations. For additional examples of this possible connection, see
infra note 62.
5
We selected the LEXIS database both because of the coders' familiarity with the database and
because, after informal testing, it appeared to be the most comprehensive of the on-line databases with respect
to the subject matter of this study. The Delaware Corporate Cases database is, if anything, overinclusive as it
includes all Delaware state court cases involving some aspect ofbusiness law.
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To prevent a biased selection of cases, we utilized the Research
Randomizer" to obtain 20 random cases for each individual year, for a
total of 200 cases. For example, Lexis listed 157 cases matching our
criterion for the year 1997. The Research Randomizer then provided a
list of 20 random numbers between 1 and 157. We then matched the
random numbers to the cases in the list to obtain our random sample (i.e.,
if the random numbers were 3 and 91, the third and ninety-first cases
listed by Lexis became Case 1 and Case 2 for our sample).
We contemplated a strategy where 200 cases would be randomly
selected from the 1,655 but found that this strategy would not help us
meet our research objectives. Although there is great benefit in this more
random method, this strategy would likely result in an uneven number of
cases from each year and prohibit some statistical analyses. Accordingly,
we used the stratified random selection method described above. We
used the same selection method for the interval study of years 1965-66,
1975-76, 1985-86, 1995-96, and 2005-06.52
The primary focus of our study was legal scholarship. We did not
limit our study, however, to traditional academic scholarship. Rather, we
invoked a very broad definition of "scholarship" and coded any reference
materials explaining or describing legal concepts, other than case and
statutory law, as a form of scholarship. We excluded dictionaries,
thesauruses, newspapers, and other general sources. We excluded these
latter sources because we determined that they generally did not serve as
alternatives to academic scholarship. This broader definition and analysis
of scholarship allowed us to better understand the types of sources the
courts consider in their decisions and allowed us to examine whether
these sources are used differently or more often than others.
We used nine different categories to code our broad definition of
scholarship, and we searched for materials within these categories both in
the footnotes and the text of decisions. These nine categories are: general
law review or journal (university), specialized law review or journal
(university), legal periodical or journal (non-university), business journal
or periodical (non-university), treatise, textbook, educational materials
(such as ALI course materials), articles on SSRN without a current
publication citation, and Restatements. The prevalence of citations to
Restatements warranted them receiving their own category outside of
treatises. We refer to this variable as the "source" of the scholarship.
*

Research Randomizer, www.randomizer.org (last visited Aug. 25,2010).
Past citation studies also have invoked this type of interval analysis in detecting trends in
judicial citation patterns. See, e.g., McClintock,supra note 38; Sirico, supra note 3.
52
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To further refine our analysis, we identified eight types of scholarship
that potentially could define the character and purpose of the scholarship.
These eight types are: doctrinal, normative, case study, interdisciplinary,
legal theory, empirical, comparative, and historical." Recognizing that
scholarship often invokes a combination of these eight characteristics, we
coded both the primary approach of the scholarship as well as all
approaches used in the particular piece. We also identified objective traits
common to each type of scholarship to foster uniformity in the coding of
this variable. We refer to this variable as the "type" of scholarship.
In addition to the source and scholarship type, we also coded variables
relating to the underlying case and scholarship usage, if any, within the
decision. For the underlying case, our variables included the date of the
decision, the number of plaintiffs and defendants, the identity of the
moving party, the relief requested and granted or denied, and the judge
rendering the decision. To examine scholarship usage, our variables
included the number of scholarship cites, the author and his or her
affiliation, the date of the scholarship, the primary relation between the
scholarship cite and the decision (e.g., procedural issue versus substantive
issue), and whether the court quoted from the scholarship.
We tested and obtained inter-coder reliability under the following
process.' Three coders received ten cases at a time to code for every
variable. When finished, coders compared their results and resolved all
discrepancies. The coders then received an additional ten cases to code
individually and then compare. This initial process continued until
coders obtained 90 percent reliability in individual coding for all of the
variables. The coders then proceeded to code the 200 randomly selected
cases for the core study and the additional 157 randomly selected cases for
the interval study.

5
Recognizing that several of the terms used to code the "type" of scholarship have multiple
definitions, we developed detailed definitions for the coders to use solely for purposes of this study. For
example, "doctrinal" was defined as scholarship that explains and analyzes existing law (e.g., what the law is,
why it is that way and general observations or critiques about existing law). The term "normative" was defined
as scholarship that assesses whether existing law corresponds to the author's normative views about the law
(e.g., what the law should be and what doctrinal changes, if any, are necessary to meet that standard). The
term "theoretical" was defined as scholarship that discusses the author's normative views or theory in the
abstract with little, if any, discussion of existing law or legal doctrine (e.g., theory divorced from existing
doctrine). The study does not suggest that these are the appropriate or only ways to define different categories
of scholarship; their use was intended to provide clarity and consistency to categories coded within the study.
5
In addition, we worked to identify objective measures and definitions to guide the coding of
variables that could invoke coder bias such as the type of scholarship and the judge's agreement or
disagreement with the scholarship.
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B. Methodologyforludges' Survey
To supplement the core and interval studies, we designed a written
survey to solicit more subjective, qualitative data from the judges deciding
at least some of the cases included in the data set described above.
Specifically, we sent the survey to fifty-three judges presently serving on
the Delaware bench." This sample included twenty-five judges who
wrote opinions included in our core study database. The survey was
administered on an anonymous basis to foster full and candid
participation by the judges. Of the fifty-three judges receiving the survey,
twenty judges responded to the survey (the "participating judges") for a
response rate of approximately 38 percent. Sixteen of the participating
judges (80 percent) indicated that at least part of his or her docket
included business law cases.
The survey questions asked the judges about their general use of
academic scholarship in judicial opinions, and whether this use differed
when deciding business law cases. The survey defined "academic
scholarship" as law review or law journal articles written by full-time law
faculty. The survey also sought to gain insight into how judges identify
and select reference sources, such as academic scholarship, and whether
judges consult or find use for these reference sources even when not cited
in the judicial opinion itself.
IV. DATA REPORT AND ANALYSES
Our study involved many stages and distinct components.
Accordingly, this Part presents the key statistical analyses in three sections.
The first section concerns the 1997-2007 sample of 200 cases. Initial
analyses focus on which factors predict whether the case opinion cited
scholarship and, if appropriate, the amount of scholarship cited.
Additionally, the analyses consider whether judges cite different types or
sources of scholarship or authors more frequently than others. The
second section explains how these analyses differ from the interval study
that adds to the 1997-2007 sample cases dating back to 1965. The third
section analyzes the judges' survey to supplement the hard data with
inside information from the individuals writing the opinions.
5
We distributed the survey to all judges serving the Delaware State Courts as of February 2009.
This distribution included the Delaware Supreme Court, Court of Chancery, Superior Court, Family Court,
and Court of Common Pleas. A total of fifty-three judges were identified, excluding the Chief Magistrate for
the Justice of the Peace Courts.
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A. FactorsPredicting Use ofAll Scholarshipin Core Study
We sought to determine any significant relationships between the
individual case factors, and whether the case cited any scholarship as
defined by the nine categories.s" Of the 200 cases in the core study, 92 (46
percent) cited at least one piece of scholarship. For these analyses, we ran
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Chi-squared statistical analyses with
scholarship represented as a binary variable (0 = no scholarship; 1 =
In addition to tracking whether a case cited
scholarship cited).
scholarship, we also considered the number of scholarship pieces cited.
Of the opinions citing scholarship, 17 percent cited one piece of
scholarship; 14 percent cited two; eight percent cited three; four percent
cited four; and four percent cited more than four with one case citing
The mean number of
seventeen different pieces of scholarship.
of
the quantitative nature
=
1.92.
Because
was
1.13,
SD
scholarship cites
of this variable, these analyses rely on not only ANOVA and Chi-squared
analysis but also correlation matrices, when appropriate, to determine
linear relationships between the number of scholarship citations and other
quantitative variables (such as number of plaintiffs, defendants, cases and
opinion pages). To more clearly present the findings, the following
sections first analyze the binary (yes/no) variable then the quantitative
(how much?) variable."
la. Trends in Scholarship Use
Starting with our primary hypothesis, we found that there is no
significant overall trend regarding the citation of scholarship in Delaware
business law cases between 1998 and 2007 (p = .385).5' This counters
previous empirical findings that showed a decrease in the use of
scholarship.59 We then performed post-hoc analyses, in particular the least
significant difference (LSD) method, and found that the case opinions in
1998 and 2004 were significantly less likely to cite scholarship than the
other years. No other differences between years emerged. However, to
56
See supra Part M.A (defining nine categories of scholarship).
s7
In the following analyses, we generally present only the significance values (p-values) for each
measure, with some occasional F-values and r-values included as necessary. Readers interested in effect sizes
are welcome to contact the second author, Jason A Cantone, for more developed statistical information on the
correlations, Chi-square tests, ANOVAs, post-hoc analyses, and multiple regressions performed. In addition,
the authors considered effect sizes and statistical power when assessing the interpretability of significant results.
5
See infa Table 1.

s9

See McClintock, supra note 38.
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stop at this blunt conclusion would discount the important and significant
trends in scholarship that did emerge and that may aid academics
interested in influencing decisional law through their scholarship.
Table 1. Overall Scholarship Usage in 1998-2007 Sample
Percentage
Cited Scholarship Did Not Cite
Year
Citing
(# citing law
reviews)
Scholarship
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total

6(4)
9(2)
12 (2)
8(3)
11 (1)
11(3)
5 (2)
10(1)
11(4)
9 (5)..
92

14
11
8
12
9
9
15
10
9
11
108

30%
45%
60%
40%
55%
55%
25%
50%
55%
45%
46%

Mixed results emerged regarding the court issuing the opinion.
Overall, the issuing court was not a predictive factor in whether or not the
opinion cited scholarship (p = .378). However, post-hoc analyses found
that significant differences did exist between individual issuing courts.
For example, the twenty cases from the Superior Court of Delaware-New
Castle were significantly less likely to cite scholarship than the overall case
sample (only 30 percent cited scholarship, as compared to the overall
average of 46 percent). No other individual court significantly differed
from the overall average.'
Case opinions ranged from two to eighty-nine pages long, but case
opinions featuring scholarship were significantly longer than case
opinions not featuring scholarship (p < .001).61 In addition, case opinions

6
Because the study looked to all courts in the state of Delaware dealing with corporate issues, some
courts appeared no more than five times in the overall sample. Accordingly, additional analyses regarding the
issuing court had small effect sizes and are not reported herein. While future research examining any
differences between courts could randomly selected cases for each issuing court, the goal of this researchlooking to the overall use of scholarship over a ten-year period (core study) and forty-year period (interval
study)- is best accomplished by randomly selecting cases within the selected years.
61
(M= 20.26, SD = 14.87); (M = 2431 pages, SD = 16.53); (M= 16.82 pages, SD = 12.38).
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featuring scholarship included significantly more cites to cases (M =
20.01 cases, SD = 13.22) than case opinions without scholarship (M=
12.00 cases, SD = 10.18) (p < .001). This makes intuitive sense, as
individual judges writing longer case opinions might also be more likely
to include law review articles, journals, and cases to support his or her
opifiion. Whether longer case opinions demand scholarship support or
whether case opinions citing scholarship tend to then become longer, is a
question beyond this research but interesting to the researchers and
worthy of further review through a study into how judges make their
decisions. Whether longer case opinions citing more scholarship involve
more complex issues and final decisions is, however, a question discussed
infra.
To further analyze predictive factors, we examined the authors of the
opinions.
There were 35 different named authors (along with
memorandum and no author mentioned opinions); nevertheless, Justice
Jacobs, Chancellor Chandler, and Vice Chancellors Lamb, Strine, and
Noble combined to provide 117 (59 percent) of the case opinions.
Although only 45 percent of the 200 cases cited scholarship, Vice
Chancellor Strine included scholarship in 71 percent of his opinions,
more than any judge in the analyses. Chancellor Chandler, on the other
hand, included scholarship in just 31 percent of his cases, significantly
lower than the overall average. Justice Jacobs and Vice Chancellors Lamb
and Noble all cited at the overall average level (53 percent, 53 percent, and
50 percent, respectively).62

Justice Jacobs, Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine serve as adjunct and
visiting professors of law at several different law schools, publish articles in law reviews, and
participate in academic symposia. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Great Debate: A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067 (2002); William B.
Chandler III, Thoughts on the North Dakota Publicly Traded CorporationsAct of2007, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1051
(2008); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate
Governance System: PreliminaryReflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 953
(2003); Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-ProcedureDistinction in Contemporary Corporate Litigation:
An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lecture, Human Freedom and Two
Friedmen:Musings on the Implicationsof Globalizationfor the Effective Regulation of CorporateBehaviour, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 241 (2008); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do CorporateLaw and Some of
the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL.J. CORP. L. 673 (2005). For biographical information
on the judges, see also Del. State Courts,judges, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2010). Their active participation with the academic community may explain in part their greater
tendency to cite academic scholarship. Nevertheless, the weight to accord this correlation should be
balanced by factors such as some judges who cite academic scholarship more frequently do not appear
to be as active in the academic community (i.e., Vice Chancellor Noble and former Vice Chancellor
Lamb) and other judges who do not cite academic scholarship as frequently do in fact publish articles
62
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In light of the past literature, we also sought to answer whether
citations to law review articles significantly changed during the 1998 to
2007 time period.' Only 13 percent of case opinions cited a law review
article (either general or in a specialized journal), and 29 percent of the
overall cited scholarship were law review articles. We found that law
review citation patterns have not significantly changed over this time
period (p = .5 5 7 ).'

This continues to counter past research. However,

law reviews represented 40 percent of the cited scholarship in 1998 and 36
percent of the cited scholarship in 2007. The year 1998 is particularly
noteworthy because it is also one of the two years (2004 being the other)
where scholarship was least likely to be cited.6 ' Thus, in 1998, case
opinions particularly relied on law reviews.'
lb. Trends in ScholarshipAmount
We also analyzed how much scholarship a case opinion cited. More
recent cases cited marginally more scholarship than older cases in the ten
year span (p = .058). However, post-hoc analyses found that an outlier
year likely causes this marginal trend. Opinions in 2006 used significantly
more scholarship than 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
and 2007.67 2006 was the only year that significantly differed from other
years in the span. As such, it is not likely an overall trend for more
scholarship but, rather, because of an outlier year for scholarship toward
the end of our analysis period.
As with the binary scholarship variable, we found no overall
significant effect regarding the issuing court (p = .503). Interestingly,
in law reviews themselves (e.g., ChiefJustice Steele and former ChiefJustice Veasey). See, e.g., Myron
T. Steele, judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability
Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2007); E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial
Decisionmaking in CorporateLaw, 1 DEL. L. REV. 169 (1998).
63
See supra Part ll.
6
Seesupra Table1.
6s
The overall citation rate for academic scholarship is very low. Although this level has not changed
over time, it still may cause concern for scholars who target the bench and bar in some or all of their
scholarship. Nevertheless, as discussed infra Part V, the types of cases that use academic scholarship, as well as
the indication that judges consult academic scholarship even if they do not cite it in their opinions, may
provide some encouragement for these scholars.
6
As with scholarship overall, case opinions that were longer (p < .001) and cited more cases (p <
.001), cited more law review articles and neither the issuing court (p = 354) nor the author of the opinion (p
= .680) was a significant predictor ofwhether the case opinion cited a law review article.
67
Opinions in 2006 cite significantly more scholarship than 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2005
at the p < .01 level and significantly more scholarship than 2002, 2003, and 2007 at the p < .05 leveL
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cases decided in the Court of Chancery-New Castle averaged 1.40 pieces
of scholarship,' while no other court averaged higher than .89 pieces. All
seven cases in the sample that cited more than five pieces of scholarship
came from the Court of Chancery-New Castle.
More scholarship was cited in longer case opinions (p < .001) and
opinions citing a larger number of cases (p < .001), consistent with the
binary scholarship variable findings. In addition, some individual judges
used scholarship more frequently than others. Although the average
number of pieces cited was 1.13 across all cases, Vice Chancellor Strine
averaged 3.19 pieces while Chief Justice Steele averaged .64 pieces. This
result is consistent with the above suggestion that Vice Chancellor Strine
is more likely to use scholarship. Thus, we detected individual differences
not only in whether a judge uses scholarship, but also in how much.
2a. PartiesInvolved in Cases
The parties involved in a controversy might influence a judge's
decision to cite scholarship. Accordingly, we coded and considered the
identity of litigants. Opinions that cite scholarship have significantly
more plaintiffs (p < .05) .69 However, there is no significant difference in
the number of defendants.
Whether the plaintiff, defendant, both, or neither party is a
corporation or business entity does not significantly affect scholarship
citation overall (p = .170). Yet, it is interesting to note that fifty two
percent of case opinions with the defendant as a corporation or business
entity cited scholarship. This slips to 42 percent when both the plaintiff
and defendant are corporations or business entities and to 30 percent
when only the plaintiff is a corporation or business entity.
In addition, the court is marginally less likely to cite scholarship when
the defendant is the moving party (37 percent cite) or both are moving
parties (39 percent cite), than when the plaintiff is the moving party (49
percent cite) (p = .075). This variable looks across all motions, including
motions for summary judgment.
We then created a new interaction variable that combined who is the
corporation and who is the moving party to determine whether citation
patterns stem from corporate status, moving party, or an interaction of
both. Cases with the defendant as a corporation or business entity and the
plaintiff as the moving party were significantly more likely to cite
68

69

SD = 2.25.
M cite = 5.09; M no-cite = 1.79.
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scholarship (59 percent did p < .05). None of the cases with the plaintiff
as the corporation and defendant as the moving party cited scholarship.
Thus, predicting scholarship usage should take into account both
corporate status of the parties and who is the moving party.o
Focusing specifically on law review articles, case opinions that cited at
least one law review article had significantly more plaintiffs (p < .01) and
defendants (p < .05)." This is a noticeably stronger effect than for overall
scholarship use. Which party is a corporation and which party is the
moving party did not significantly affect whether the case opinion cited a
law review article. However, thirteen (48 percent) of the case opinions
citing a law review article involved the plaintiff as a shareholder or
stockholder in the corporation; whereas only sixty-three (32 percent) of
all cases involved a plaintiff shareholder or stockholder.
2b. Identity of PartiesandAmount of Scholarship
If the identity of litigants influences whether scholarship is cited, then
it might also affect the amount of scholarship. While opinions citing
scholarship have only marginally more plaintiffs, there is a significant
correlation between amount of scholarship and number of parties, such
that opinions with more plaintiffs (p < .001) and more defendants (p-<
.05) cite more scholarship. Cases with plaintiff corporations cited fewer
pieces of scholarship compared to when the defendant, both parties, or
neither party is a corporation (p < .05).72 The moving party and type of
plaintiff or defendant did not significantly affect the amount of
scholarship cited.
This result regarding plaintiffs is particularly notable because opinions
in 2006 (the year that resulted in significantly more scholarship cited) also

We also analyzed the 135 opinions with individual, named plaintiffs to determine their role in
relationship to the corporation (Le. director, shareholder, partner, creditor) and whether particular types of
plaintiffs appeared more often in opinions citing scholarship. The most common plaintiff role was
shareholder/stockholder, in sixty-five (48%) of the case opinions naming an individual plaintiff Within these
cases, 46% of the opinions cited scholarship, about the overall average for all cases. No significant effects
emerged regarding types of plaintiffs. Analyzing the 124 opinions with individual, named defendants,
directors were the most common role, in sixty-one (49%) of case opinions naming an individual defendant
Forty-four percent of these case opinions included scholarship, again about the overall average. While only
33% ofopinions with a defendant stockholder/shareholder cited scholarship, too few of these cases appeared to
provide the necessary statistical sample size for further analysis.
71
Plaintiffs (MLR = 9.67; MNO LR = 230); defendants (MLR = 6.93; MNO LR = 4.45).
72
Plaintiff corporations (M = .46, SD = .87); defendant corporations (M = 1.19, SD = 1.68); both
corporations (M= 1.20, SD = 254); neither (M = .85, SD = 121).
70
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involved significantly more plaintiffs (p < .05) and were marginally longer
in page number (p = .064). Accordingly, it appears that both the number
of plaintiffs and whether the plaintiff is a corporation affect scholarship
usage. Overall, the 2006 case opinions were significantly more likely to
involve a breach of contract (in 40 percent of 2006 case opinions versus 24
percent of all case opinions)." As will be explained in the next section,
case opinions regarding a breach of contract often include citations to
relevant Restatements and treatises, which could help explain the
increased use of scholarship in 2006.
3a. Case Controversy
The final category of data analysis involved the relationship between
scholarship usage and the type of pleading filed or cause of action asserted.
The most common type of motion was a motion for summary judgment,
in 27 percent of the cases. 7 In these opinions, 54 percent cited
scholarship, not significantly different from the overall average. Opinions
concerning a motion to dismiss all claims (35 percent cited) and motions
for preliminary injunctions (36 percent cited) were both significantly less
likely to cite scholarship than the overall average (p < .05).
To analyze cause of action, we utilized a three-tiered approach. First,
to better understand cases with multiple causes of action, we recorded and
analyzed the prominent cause of action in each case. Cases primarily
focused on breach of contract claims were significantly more likely to cite
scholarship (70 percent did). This makes sense, as breach of contract
cases almost always cited the relevant Restatement or treatise. All other
causes of action either showed no significant differences or did not
provide enough cases for a reliable analysis.
Second, we recorded all of the causes of action involved in the case.
To clarify, the first analysis considered the total number of cases (200) and

"
Cases in 2006 did not significantly differ from the other years (overall) in number of defendants,
type of plaintiff or defendant, number of cases cited, which party filed the pleading which party was a
corporation, or court issuing opinion. Cases in 2006 were marginally more likely to name an individual as a
party (p = .059). See infra note 90 and accompanying text
7
Regarding the type of motion/action being considered, in order of frequency rank, they were:
motion for summary judgment (27/o), motion to dismiss all claims (19%), pleading after trial (i.e. set aside,
reconsider) (17/), "other pre-trial motion" (12/6), non-motion case decision (the judge decided the case itself
and was not acting on a motion of any type by either party) (9%), post-trial motion (8%), and motion for
preliminary injunction (6%). Motion to certify a class, motion to dismiss some claims, and "other" each
represented 2% ofthe sample. Some motion types were not in a sufficient number ofcase opinions to offer a
large enough effect size for effective analysis.
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focused on one prominent cause of action for each; the second analysis
considered each individual cause of action separately (311 total within the
200 cases).s

Sixty-eight percent of case opinions involving fraud and
mismanagement issues and 63 percent of case opinions involving breach
of contract cited scholarship. These causes of action were the most likely
to cite scholarship. Furthermore, Chi-squared analysis found that
opinions involving a breach of contract claim 76 were significantly more
likely to cite scholarship (p < .001)." This confirmed the first-tier and
second-tier findings. Opinions including inspection right issues and
discovery issues were significantly less likely to cite scholarship (38
percent and 0 percent cite, respectively; however, there were only three
cases in the sample with discovery issues).
Third, given our focus on business law cases, we split the causes of
action into internal affairs (e.g., corporate governance and related issues),
external affairs (e.g., other business law issues), and other (e.g., nonbusiness law issues)." No significant difference emerged based upon this
distinction (p = .56).
We then analyzed what the court decided in each opinion and for
whom. Regarding what was decided, the opinion was significantly less
likely to cite scholarship when the pleading was granted in full (38 percent
did) or when it was denied in full (41 percent did) than when it was
granted or denied in part (p = .053). This finding hints at the fact that
more complex cases with multiple issues warranting "in part" judgments
might require more scholarship citation to resolve them effectively.79
The type of motion being considered, the cause of action, who the
court found for, and what the court found did not significantly differ
between opinions citing law review articles and those which did not.
In summary, while there is not an overall trend supporting a decline
in scholarship as shown by other empirical research, our study found
individual variables within the cases that significantly predict the use of
7s
The coders did not code all causes of action or claims asserted by the parties in the litigation.
Rather, they focused on and coded those causes of action and claims that garnered substantive review by the
court in the judicial decision included in the database.
76
Coded 1 = includes claim; 0 = does not include.
7
X (1) = 6.92.
78
For a general discussion of the internal affairs doctrine, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of
Pinocddo: Now I'm a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L REV. 829, 840 (2004); Frederick Tung, Before Compeition: Ongins ofde
Intemal Afain Dwrine,32J. CORP. L 33, 44-46 (2006); see also Roe, supra note 7, at 596-98.
79
Opinions that affirmed lower court judgments were significantly more likely to cite scholarship
(sixty-four percent cited scholarship).
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scholarship. It is likely that an opinion that (1) is longer in page number,
(2) includes more case citations, (3) is authored by Vice Chancellor Strine,
(4) features more plaintiffs, (5) involves the plaintiff as a moving party, (6)
is against a defendant corporation, (7) involves breach of contract issues,
and (8) affirms a lower court judgment will be most likely to cite
scholarship.
We then performed a multiple regression with these eight factors.
The overall model with all eight variables significantly predicted whether
the case opinion cited scholarship." However, only the number of cases
cited (p < .01) and whether the case involved a breach of contract claim (p
< .01) were significant predictors within the model."
3b. Case Controversy and Amount of Scholarship
The overall type of motion or cause of action did not significantly
affect the number of scholarship pieces cited. However, as compared to
the other types of motions, opinions concerning a motion for preliminary
injunction cited significantly fewer pieces of scholarship.' In analyzing
the primary cause of action, we followed the same three-tiered approach.
First, we examined whether the primary cause of action resulted in
differential use of scholarship. There was no overall effect, but breach of
contract claims averaged the most pieces of scholarship.' These results
add increased support that motions for preliminary injunctions were
significantly less likely to cite scholarship, and breach of contract claims
were significantly more likely to cite scholarship.
No significant
differences emerged regarding the individual causes of action or in the
internal affairs doctrine split.
Additional analyses revealed that case decisions finding for the
plaintiff in part cited significantly more scholarship than cases resulting in
a finding for the plaintiff in full (p < .05). No other significant differences
emerged regarding the case decision. Still, the suggestion that a finding in
part corresponds with significantly more scholarship contributes to the
idea that more difficult cases warrant more scholarship support.
F (8, 187) = 4.00, p < .001, R2 = .15.
B = 308; B = .193. A reduced model with just these two variables also significantly predicted use
of scholarship, F (2, 197) = 16.23, p < .001, R2 = .14, and both breach of contract (B = .189 , p < .01) and
number of cases cited (B = .327, p < .001) remained individually significant. Thus, both the type of claim
(breach of contract, in particular) and case citation preference of the opinion writer (in number of cases cited
overall) most significantly impact the use of scholarship.
8
M =.45,SD =.69.
3
M = 1.78, S = 1.87.
80

81
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In summary, an opinion that (1) is longer in page number, (2)
includes more case citations, (3) is authored by Vice Chancellor Strine, (4)
features more plaintiffs, (5) features more defendants, (6) involves breach
of contract issues, and (7) finds for the plaintiff in part (as opposed to in
full) will likely cite more scholarship.'
We then performed a multiple regression with these seven factors.
The overall model significantly predicted whether the case opinion cited
scholarship."s As with the binary scholarship variable, the number of cases
cited (p < .001) and whether the case involved a breach of contract claim
(p < .01) were significant predictors within the model, but number of
plaintiffs was also an independent significant predictor in this model (p <
.01)." A reduced model with just these three variables also significantly
predicted use of scholarship.8 1
Consequently, the type of claim (breach of contract), number of
plaintiffs, and decision of the opinion writer (in number of cases cited
overall) most significantly alter how much scholarship is used, while the
type of claim and number of cited cases best predict overall use of
scholarship. However, what about the articles themselves? What
guidance do they provide regarding scholarship usage?
B. The Type and Source of Scholarship Cites in Core Study
Overall, 221 pieces of scholarship were cited in the 200 cases in the
core study. We then utilized set standards for defining the scholarship as
It is important to recognize that
doctrinal, normative, or other."
throughout this article we classify type of scholarship based on the
primary focus of, or most often used approach, in the particular piece of
scholarship. Admittedly, scholarship can and often does reflect more than
one approach, and the lines between approaches can be blurred. We
worked to account for these factors in our analysis.

8
It is interesting to focus again on the 2006 case opinions, which involved significantly more
scholarship. In 2006, as stated supra Part IVA, case opinions were marginally longer, involved significantly
more plaintiffs, and were significantly more likely to involve a breach ofcontract These are three ofthe seven
influential fictors put into the multiple regression.
8s
F (7,188) = 2 9 .7 3 ,p < .001, R 2 = .29.
8
B = .444; B = .180; B = .175.
8
F (3, 197) = 2 5.2 3 , p < .001, R2 = .28; breach of contract (B = .16 6 , p < .01); number of cases
cited; (B = .446, p < .001); number ofplaintiffs (B = .167, p < .001).
8
See supra note 53 (definitions of doctrinal, normative, and other categories of scholarship used in
coding process).
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Of the 221 articles, a staggering 167 (75.6 percent) were coded as
primarily doctrinal while 49 (22.2 percent) were primarily normative.
Others (combined for 2.3 percent) consisted of comparative pieces,
empirical interdisciplinary works, and case studies. Just as we were
concerned that a case's primary cause of action does not accurately portray
whether individual causes of action within the case have a significant role
in scholarship usage, we also assessed whether the piece of scholarship
cited had any doctrinal, normative, or other components that could
warrant significant differences. Even this broader definition resulted in a
large disparity, with 219 (99.1 percent) articles citing a doctrinal
component and 63 (28.5 percent) citing a normative component.
1. Overview ofDoctrinal/Non-DoctrinalDistinction
It is clear that opinions cite doctrinal articles more often, but do these
opinions differ from those that cite normative or other scholarship types?
Because of the overwhelming dominance of doctrinal scholarship, further
analyses classified the type of scholarship as either doctrinal or nondoctrinal.
Using an analyses of variance (ANOVA) design, we found that cases
citing doctrinal scholarship are significantly shorter (p < .05), have
significantly fewer defendants (p < .001), cite significantly fewer cases (p
< .001), are more likely to have a corporate defendant (p = .051) and cite
scholarship pieces significantly more often within the same opinion (p <
.05) than cases citing non-doctrinal articles. Doctrinal scholarship is also
more likely to be cited across every year studied (p < .05), as compared to
non-doctrinal scholarship, with the notable exception of 2006, where only
56 percent of scholarship was doctrinal. As stated above, 2006 is also the
year in which significantly more scholarship was cited." It appears that this
increased scholarship usage resulted in not just more of the same, but also
a more diverse sampling of scholarship and an increased reliance on nondoctrinal scholarship.'
SeesupraPart IVAb.
Notably, 2006 was an active period for the development and refinement of crucial
corporate law principles. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court decided In re the Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), which provided extensive analysis of breach of
fiduciary duty claims against corporate directors and certain other parties in litigation spanning almost
ten years, and Stone ex rel. AmSouthBancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), which clarified the
obligation of good faith under Delaware law, as described in Walt Disney, and revisited director
liability for failure to monitor claims, commonly referred to as Caremark claims. The Delaware
Chancery Court also resolved several unsettled issues, including the liability of directors for
8
9
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Opinions cited doctrinal scholarship more often, regardless of the
motion considered by the court (p < .001). Among the 54 pieces of
scholarship associated with cases involving a motion to dismiss, 25 (48
percent) were non-doctrinal. This is a significantly higher percentage of
non-doctrinal pieces than in the other categories, such as motion for
summary judgment (14 percent non-doctrinal) and non-motion case
decisions (5 percent non-doctrinal). Across the causes of action, cited
scholarship is significantly more likely to be doctrinal (p < .05) but there
is a more even split within the breach of duty causes of action (where 42
percent of cited scholarship is non-doctrinal).
Regarding the primary type of scholarship and the cause of action
(internal affairs; external affairs; other), a marginal effect emerged (p =
.067) such that non-doctrinal scholarship was more likely to be used in
internal affairs cases. Eighty-six percent of the non-doctrinal scholarship
was in internal affairs cases, while 57 percent of the doctrinal scholarship
was in internal affairs cases.
Individual differences among the opinion writers again emerged.
Although the judges were overall more likely to use doctrinal pieces of
scholarship (p < .01), 34 (42 percent) of the pieces of scholarship cited by
Vice Chancellor Strine were non-doctrinal and four (66 percent) of the
pieces of scholarship cited by Judge Holland were non-doctrinal. The
other thirty judges showed a significant preference for doctrinal pieces of
scholarship.
2. Source of Scholarship
We then examined the type of publications cited across the sample
and determined that 44 (20 percent) came from a general university law
review or journal, 15 (7 percent) from a specialized university law review
or journal, three (1 percent) from a non-university legal journal or
periodical, 92 (42 percent) from a treatise, 22 (10 percent) from a
textbook, 16 (7 percent) from educational materials (e.g., ALI-ABA course
materials), one (0.5 percent) from an article on SSRN, and 28 (13
percent) from a Restatement."

deepening insolvency claims and the interplay of state and federal law with respect to shareholders'
rights to approve a sale of substantially all of a company's assets. See, e.g., Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006) (deepening insolvency claim); Esopus Creek
Value LP v. Hauf, 913 A.2d 593 (Del. Ch. 2006) (shareholders' rights).
91
See infra Figure 1.
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type of publication
M not specified
law review or
=general
journal university
nispecialized law review or
journal university
legal journal or periodical
non-university
171treatise

I textbook
educational materials (ALlElABA
Course materials,
etc.
Srestatement

Figure 1
The 59 law review article citations represented 39 different articles,
after accounting for repeated articles. We then coded for the rank of the
law review. 92 As opposed to expectations, the majority of law review
articles cited were not from the top 10 law reviews; rather, eleven (28.2
percent) came from the top 10, seven (17.9 percent) from 11-25, six (15.4
percent) from 26-50, ten (25.6 percent) from 51-100 and five (12.8
percent) were not from the top 100 law reviews.93
Treatises are cited significantly more often than any other type of
scholarship, and this is particularly true within motions for summary
9

We used the combined ranking (which is the "normalized weighted combination of both the
journal's impact factor and total cites received") from the Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, LawJournals:Submissions andRanking, httpV/awlib.wlu.edu/Ij/index.aspx
(last visited Feb. 25,2010).
93
This data contradict the findings of some studies, but generally support the findings in the
Lawless & David study. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of
citation studies and the elite law reviews, see Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to
Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 429 (2000) ("Articles in elite law reviews with few
citations, however, are more likely to be of low quality.").
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judgment (33 (59 percent) are treatises) and opinions issued after trial (21
(51 percent) are treatises). Coders then determined whether the cited
scholarship was in agreement, disagreement, or neither with the ultimate
opinion decision. For example, if the law review article focused on how
there should be no fiduciary duty in a particular type of case, but the
opinion author disagreed and used the citation as a counter cite to the
ultimate finding that a fiduciary duty does exist, it would be coded as
"disagree." As expected, treatises were most often cited in agreement with
the opinion's decision (in 82 (92 percent of the time)). General university
law reviews or journals were marginally more likely to be cited neither in
agreement nor disagreement with the opinion than the other publication
types (p = .063).9
When scholarship is cited in an opinion regarding a motion to dismiss,
it is significantly more likely to be a general university law review or
journal (22 (41 percent) were), as compared to all other publication types.
A general university law review or journal is also the only type
significantly more likely to be cited when the defendant files the pleading
at issue in the opinion (p < .05), as compared to when the plaintiff is the
moving party.
Type of scholarship also significantly corresponded with the cause of
action (p < .05). This effect emerged in part because breach of contract
cases were significantly more likely to cite treatises or Restatements than
any other cause of action. In addition, external issues cases were
significantly more likely to cite a treatise than any other publication type
(p < .001). Interestingly, all fifteen specialized university law review or
journal publications and sixteen of seventeen textbook citations stemmed
from opinions focused on internal affairs issues."
Significantly longer case opinions were more likely to cite specialized
university law reviews and journals (p < .001) and cite more cases overall
(p < .01). This correlation does not presuppose the direction of the
effect; again, longer case opinions might cite more cases or the need to
discuss additional cases might warrant a longer opinion.

9
No effect emerged regarding the placement of the citation (e.g. in footnote, text, both) by type of
publication (p = .096). In addition, no effect emerged regarding the purpose of the citation (e.g. background,
procedure, substantive issue, tangential issue) (p = 283) or whether an exact quote was taken (p = .849).
9
Individual differences based upon the opinion writer emerged such that Chancellor
Chandler was significantly more likely to cite general university law reviews or journals than (1) any
other publication type and (2) any other opinion writer, and Vice Chancellor Lamb was significantly
more likely to cite a treatise than any other publication type (p < .001).

%

Seesupra Part IVAla.
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No publication type significantly correlated with the number of
plaintiffs (p = .172), but opinions citing specialized university law reviews
and journals had significantly more plaintiffs than cases citing textbooks,
educational materials, or Restatements (p < .05). Cases citing university
law reviews and journals (both general and specialized) have significantly
more defendants (p < .001) than cases citing other types of publications.
These results might stem from judges using law reviews to explain more
complex issues that involve significantly more parties and require
significantly longer opinions to explain the opinion's finding.
3. Doctrinal Versus NormativeArticles
University-based publications were significantly more likely to be
normative (p < .001). Thirty (68 percent) of the general university law
review or journals and eleven (73 percent) of the specialized university
law reviews or journals cited were primarily normative. Only 22 percent
of the cited scholarship overall was primarily normative.
We sought to further examine the differential usage of doctrinal and
normative articles, as compared to doctrinal and normative other pieces of
scholarship. Of the 221 pieces of scholarship we examined, 41 (19
percent) were doctrinal articles in university-based law reviews and
journals, 41 (19 percent) were normative articles in university-based law
reviews and journals, 126 (57 percent) were doctrinal pieces in other
publication types, and 8 (3 percent) were normative pieces in other
publication types. The other types of scholarship accounted for a
combined five (2 percent) of the pieces and, thus, are not further
analyzed. To better understand how academics' work is utilized by the
Delaware judiciary, we then created a variable of doctrinal article, nondoctrinal article, doctrinal non-article, and non-doctrinal non-article to
assess relevant mean differences.
Non-doctrinal articles are cited in significantly longer opinions than
cases citing doctrinal non-articles (p < .05). Additionally, cases citing
non-doctrinal articles have significantly more defendants than cases citing
doctrinal articles or doctrinal non-articles (p < .001). Opinions citing
more cases were significantly more likely to cite non-doctrinal articles and
non-doctrinal non-articles, as compared to doctrinal articles or doctrinal
non-articles (p < .001).
Opinions resolving motions for summary judgment and case
decisions were significantly more likely to cite doctrinal non-articles,
while opinions about motions to dismiss cited non-doctrinal articles and
doctrinal non-articles evenly (p < .001). Opinions overall cited doctrinal
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non-articles most often, but this trend ebbs for case opinions when the
pleading is granted in part, or denied in part (p < .05).9 Again, these
results contribute to the possible theory that more complex cases result in
more scholarship citations." More complex cases might use articles in
particular to explain novel or controversial aspects of the various issues or
present different approaches to resolving those issues.
While doctrinal non-articles were significantly more likely to be cited
across the ten-year period, non-doctrinal articles were more likely to be
cited in the later years of the span (p < .01). Specifically, non-doctrinal
articles were significantly more likely to be cited in 2006 and 2007 than in
any other year (p < .01). Although 21 percent of the overall cited
scholarship was non-doctrinal articles, they accounted for 40 percent of
the scholarship cited in 2006 and 35 percent of the scholarship cited in
2007. This recent increasing trend to cite non-doctrinal articles could
stem from the unique attributes of the 2006 opinions discussed supra.
Even with this caveat, it still presents a sharp contrast to 2004 and 2005
where non-doctrinal articles constituted 25 percent and 5 percent of the
overall scholarship cited, respectively. This is encouraging news for
academics seeking to contribute to the resolution of business law issues in
Delaware.
4. Author of Scholarship
Additionally, we sought to examine not only what the courts cite but
whom they cite. Of the 221 pieces of scholarship cited, 2 (1 percent) were
written by assistant professors, 8 (4 percent) by associate professors, 27 (12
percent) by full professors, 41 (19 percent) by full named or chaired
professors, 4 (2 percent) by law students, 1 (0.5 percent) by a lawyerassociate, 69 (31 percent) by a lawyer-partner, 7 (3 percent) by a judge,
and 11 (5 percent) by a lawyer-unspecified. Despite intensive research,
fifty-one (23 percent) of the authors did not result in a classification.
Overall, it appears the opinions favor pieces written by lawyer-partners
over all other groups.
An interesting trend emerged regarding the tenure of the author.
While ten (90 percent) of cited pieces written by assistant and associate
professors were non-doctrinal, fifteen (55 percent) of the cited pieces
9
13/75 = doctrinal articles; 21/75 = non-doctrinal articles; 35/75 = doctrinal non-articles; 6 = nondoctrinal non-articles.
9
In addition, non-doctrinal articles were significantly less likely to agree or disagree with the
decision (p < .001) than other types of scholarship.
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written by full professors were non-doctrinal, and only six (14 percent) of
the cited pieces written by full named or chaired professors were nondoctrinal. The data suggest that this result relates, at least in part, to full
named or chaired professors authoring well-respected treatises or
textbooks that are primarily doctrinal and frequently cited by courts. It
also may relate to courts seeking out doctrinal pieces by more tenured
faculty. To better understand these findings, we created a new author
variable that separated academic (assistant, associate, full, named
professors) from practitioner (lawyer, judge) authors.99
level of tenure
M assistant professor
M associate professor
O full professor
*full named or chaired
professor
law student
lawyer-associate
Olawyer-partner
Djudge

other
*Lawyer
Mlhssing

Figure 2
A significant trend regarding the year of the decision emerged (p =
.022), such that academic authors are significantly more likely to be cited
in more recent years. For example, in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, the
courts were more likely to cite academic authors, while in 2000, 2001,
2002, and 2003, the courts were more likely to cite practitioner authors.too

9
mo

See infra Figure 2.
See infra Table 2.
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Table 2. Academic and Practitioner Authored Articles Over Time
Opinions citing pieces by academic authors contained significantly
more defendants than opinions citing practitioner authors (p < .001).o1
Although the articles overall were significantly more likely to be doctrinal,
normative articles were significantly more likely to be written by
academics (p < .05).
As expected, academics were more likely to write articles than nonarticles (p < .001). In fact, 87 percent of scholarship pieces written by
partners in law firms were doctrinal non-articles and 90 percent of
scholarship pieces written by assistant or associate professors were nondoctrinal articles. Scholarship pieces by full professors were two (7
percent) doctrinal articles, fifteen (56 percent) non-doctrinal articles, and
ten (37 percent) doctrinal non-articles; none were non-doctrinal nonarticles. Scholarship pieces by full named or chaired professors were
thirteen (32 percent) doctrinal articles, four (10 percent) non-doctrinal
articles, twenty-two (54 percent) doctrinal non-article, and two (5
percent) non-doctrinal non-articles.
Furthermore, pieces by practitioner authors were more often used
when the defendant was a corporation (p < .05) than when the plaintiff
was a director of the corporation (p < .01). Regarding the type of motion

101

Academic authors (M = 8.03, SD = 7.13); practitioner authors (M = 4.94, SD = 5.01).

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

2011]

33

being considered, academic authors were cited more often in motions to
dismiss all claims (twenty-nine (69 percent)), while practitioner authors
were cited more often in motions for summary judgment (twenty-nine
(62 percent)) (p < .05). For case outcome, court decisions for the plaintiff
were significantly more likely to cite articles by practitioners, but court
decisions for the defendant were significantly more likely to cite articles
by academics (p < .001). For example, 69 percent of the articles written
by practitioners were included in cases finding for the plaintiff No effect,
however, emerged regarding what the court found (e.g., affirmed,
reversed) (p = .89).

No overall effect emerged regarding individual opinion authors (p =
.09). However, follow-up analyses showed that Chancellor Chandler was
significantly more likely to cite academic authors, while other judges split
their citations equally (e.g., Vice Chancellors Lamb and Strine both citing
the same number of academic and practitioner-written articles). Again,
the issues involved in the controversy, as opposed to the type or source of
scholarship, appear to drive ajudge's decision to cite scholarship.
C. Results of Interval Study DatingBack to 1965
Prior studies regarding the use of legal scholarship are not limited to
the last ten year period. Thus, to better understand the trends suggested
in the core study, we performed the same analyses in an interval study
dating back to 1965. As with the core study, these 157 cases were
randomly selected from 1965, 1966, 1975, 1976, 1985, 1986, 1995, and
1996 using the random number generator and independent coders to
assure reliability of the data. The purpose of this section is not to perform
all of the above analyses de novo but, rather, to determine whether the
trends suggested in the core study also emerge in the interval study.102
la. Trends in Scholarship Use
Of the 157 cases in the interval study, 67 (42.7 percent) cite
scholarship, not significantly different from the result in the core study
(that 92 of 200, or 46 percent, cited scholarship). This result continues to
question previous findings regarding an overall decrease in scholarship
over time. Analyzing the number of scholarship pieces cited, 19 percent
cited one piece of scholarship; 13 percent cited two; 4 percent cited three;
102

As in the core study, this Part first analyzes the binary (yes/no) variable and then the quantitative

(how much?) variable. See supra Part IVA
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1 percent cited four; 4 percent cited five; and 2 percent cited six or more,
including one opinion citing fourteen different pieces of scholarship. The
mean number of scholarship cites was 0.96, lower, but not significantly
different from the 1.13 average in the core study."o'
Case opinions in 1995 were significantly less likely to cite scholarship
(only 21 percent did) than the other years. In addition, case opinions in
1966 were significantly more likely to cite scholarship (with 65 percent
citing scholarship). While this trend seems to support prior empirical
studies about the decrease in scholarship, there was no significant trend
over the entire interval period (p = .196). In fact, these two years might be
outliers, as the years in the study surrounding 1966 cited scholarship
significantly less than in 1966 (45 percent of opinions in 1965 and 38
percent of opinions in 1975).
The issuing court made a difference in whether scholarship was cited
in the interval study (p < .01). Case opinions from the Supreme Court of
Delaware were significantly more likely to cite scholarship (69 percent
did, as compared to the overall average of 43 percent), as compared to any
other court. Only 32 percent of the opinions from the Court of
Chancery-New Castle cited scholarship. These two courts combined to
provide 124 (or 79 percent) of the overall cases in the sample.
Accordingly, we lacked a statistical power to analyze all of the issuing
courts.
Case opinions ranged from two to twenty-nine pages long.'" As in
the core study, case opinions featuring scholarship were significantly
longer than case opinions not featuring scholarship (p <.01), and case
opinions citing scholarship also cited significantly more cases than
opinions not citing scholarship (p < .01).10 Case opinions in the interval
study were significantly shorter and cited significantly fewer cases than
those in the more recent years in the core study (where the average case
opinion was just over twenty pages and cited more than fifteen cases).
Overall, the 27 individual opinion authors did not differentially cite
scholarship in the interval study (p = .883). This is a smaller number of
different authors than in the core study (with thirty-five different authors)
but also a more widespread distribution of authorship; no author in the
interval study provided more than nine opinions to the sample.o'

103

SD = 1.74.

10

M = 9.70, SD = 5.10.
M = 10.93, SD = 6.01;M = 8.80, SD = 4.09;M = 331, SD = 2.26;M = 1.99, SD = 1.19.

105

106
While not statistically interpretable due to the low sample size, it is of note that Chancellor
Chandler cited scholarship in half (2 of 4) of his opinions in the interval period, slightly above the overall
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Although some empirical authorities suggest that past years were the
hey-day of legal scholarship from law reviews, cases at least in the business
law context have not significantly changed their usage of law review
articles over time. As with the core study, law reviews are neither the
most cited nor most relied on type of scholarship.
lb. Trends in ScholarshipAmount
When looking to how much scholarship a case opinion cited, no overall
trend emerged (p = .818). The core study showed a marginally
significant effect likely caused by an outlier year, but no year in the
interval study provided significantly more or less scholarship cited than in
any other year.
As with the binary scholarship variable, there was a significant effect
regarding the issuing court (p < .05), likely here because opinions from
the Supreme Court of Delaware are significantly more likely to cite at
least one piece of scholarship. In addition, opinions citing more
scholarship were longer (p < .001) and cited more cases (p < .001),
consistent with the findings for the binary variable in the interval study
and both the binary and quantitative findings in the core study. Again, the
opinion author did not overall significantly affect the amount of
scholarship used.
2a. PartiesInvolved in Cases
We then considered the parties involved in the controversy. The
number of plaintiffs and defendants did not impact whether scholarship
was cited (ps = .30, .21, respectively). In addition, it did not matter if the
defendant or plaintiff was a corporation or business entity (p = .11) or
which party filed the pleading in dispute (p = .19).107

average. In the core study, Chancellor Chandler was the one author who cited scholarship significantly less
often.
107
We also analyzed the type of plaintiffs and the type of defendants involved. While the type of
plaintiffs did provide a significant effect (p < .05), the small effect size associated with this finding (r = .009)
and the small number of cases with each type of plaintiff hinder any reports of statistical significance. As in the
core study, shareholder/stockholders were the most common type of individual plaintiff, in 77 of 112 (69
percent) cases with a named plaintiff The type of defendant also provided a significant effect in the interval
study (p < .05) but, again, corresponded with avery small effect size (r = .003). As in the core study, the most
common type of named defendant was a director, in 44 of the 83 (53 percent) cases with a named defendant.
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2b. Identity ofPartiesand Amount of Scholarship
Case opinions citing more scholarship had significantly more
plaintiffs and more defendants in the core study, but no significant effects
emerged in the interval study regarding the number of plaintiffs (p =
.474) or defendants (p = .724). Furthermore, whether the plaintiff,
defendant, both, or neither party was a corporation or business entity
provided no effect (p = .572), nor did the identity of the moving party (p
=

.954).

Analyzing the type of plaintiff suggested that case opinions with
plaintiffs as shareholders/stockholders cited significantly more scholarship
(p < .001). This result is limited by the fact that 77 of the 112 named,
study
were
across
the
interval
individual
plaintiffs
shareholders/stockholders. The next most common types of individual
plaintiffs were director and purchaser, plaintiffs in 5 case opinions each. A
similar effect emerged regarding the type of defendant (p < .001), with
the high proportion of defendant directors biasing the statistical effect.
3a. Case Controversy
No significant relationship between the type of motion and
scholarship usage emerged. The most common type of motion was a
pleading after trial (such as motion for reconsideration or to set aside the
judgment), which appeared in 18 percent of the opinions. The second
most common type was a motion for summary judgment, in 15 percent of
the cases. These two types of motions cited scholarship in 48 percent and
46 percent of cases, respectively. These. results are not significantly
different from the overall average of 43 percent.0 8 Opinions which
decided the case itself, and did not concern a motion, were significantly
less likely to cite scholarship, at 32 percent of cases. Motions to dismiss all
claims and motions for preliminary injunctions did not differ from the
overall average, as they did in the core study.
As in the core study, we utilized a three-tier approach to analyze cause
of action. However, no significant effects emerged. While it is of note
that breach of contract cases were more likely to cite scholarship (64
percent did), only eleven of the overall cases concerned breach of contract
issues.
108
In the core study, pleadings after trial were in a similar 17% of the case opinions studied.
However, 27% of the core study case opinions concerned motions for summary judgment, about twice as
high as the proportion in the interval study.
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We then analyzed the impact of the court's decision (both what was
decided and for whom). The party that the court found for did not
significantly impact the use of scholarship, but what was decided did
provide a significant effect, (p < .05) such that opinions affirming a lower
court's opinion were significantly more likely to cite scholarship (65
percent), and motions or complaints granted in part and denied in part
were significantly less likely to cite scholarship (29 percent). This result
regarding affirmations is in line with the core study but the latter is in
direct opposition. In the core study, opinions were significantly more
likely to cite scholarship when the decision was to grant or deny in part.
Here, the opposite is true.
After closer inspection, the data suggest that, in the core study, 147
(73.5 percent) of case decisions were for the plaintiff or defendant in full,
while 38 (19 percent) were for the plaintiff or defendant in part. The
remaining 15 decisions were for some, but not all defendants or plaintiffs,
or for neither party. The interval study provided similar findings, such
that 123 (78.3 percent) of case decisions were for the plaintiff or defendant
in full and 22 (14 percent) were for the plaintiff or defendant in part, with
the 12 remaining cases for some, but not all defendants or plaintiffs, or for
neither party. While it warrants closer scrutiny, this result might stem
from the fact that, in the core study, case decisions were more likely to
grant the pleading in full than to deny the pleading in full (in 37 percent
of overall core study opinions vs. 23 percent). However, in the interval
study, case decisions were more likely to deny the pleading in full than
grant the pleading in full (in 34 percent of overall interval study opinions
vs. 26 percent). This shift in case decisions could correspond with a shift
in the use of scholarship to support such decisions. 10 9

109
Several commentators suggest that Delaware courts are sensitive to the political and
economic environment in rendering decisions. Some attribute this sensitivity to Delaware's desire to
remain a prominent national authority on corporate law and, consequently, to fend offjurisdictional
competition from the federal government and other states. For a thoughtful analysis of those and
related issues, see Roe, supra note 7, at 617-27. For example, Professor Roe notes: "In the early 1980s,
Delaware was looked upon suspiciously as a state in which to incorporate: 'Corporate lawyers
recommended against Delaware incorporation ... [because] Delaware's judiciary was too 'moralistic'.'"
Roe, supra note 7, at 617 (citations omitted). Professor Roe then describes various events occurring in
the 1980s and 1990s, such as "creeping federal preemption" and developments in takeover law and
corporate privatization, that arguable influenced the Delaware courts' approach to business law cases.
Id. at 617-27. The courts' varying use of scholarship in "in part" decisions observed between the core
and interval studies may relate to this sensitivity and a conscious or unconscious move to invoke
scholarship in more complex disputes.
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3b. Case Controversy and ScholarshipAmount
Regarding the type of motion, cause of action, and amount of
scholarship cited, no overall effect emerged (p = .88; p = .21). As in the
core study, follow-up analyses found that breach of contract claims cited
an average of 1.45 pieces of scholarship, higher than the the overall
average of 0.96 pieces."o No significant differences emerged regarding
the individual causes of action or in the internal affairs doctrine split.
No significant effects emerged regarding whom the court found for (p
= .942). Opinions finding for the plaintiff in part cited significantly less
scholarship than opinions finding for the plaintiff in full (p < .05).
Regarding what was decided, cases affirming an earlier court's decision
cited significantly more scholarship than the average, and when the court
granted the motion in part, and denied the motion in part the court cited
significantly less scholarship (p < .05)."' These findings confirm the
results regarding if scholarship was cited in the interval study but, again,
contradict the core study results that cases finding for the plaintiff in part
cited the most scholarship.
D. The Type and Source of Scholarship Cites in Interval Study
Overall, the 157 opinions in the interval study cited 150 pieces of
scholarship. Of the 150 articles, 139 (93 percent) were coded as primarily
doctrinal, while 7 (5 percent) were primarily normative and 4 (2 percent)
were case studies. This is a significantly higher percentage than the
already staggering 76 percent of scholarship coded as primarily doctrinal
in the core study. We again coded to see whether the piece of scholarship
had any doctrinal or normative components and found that all 150 pieces
had a doctrinal component, while 17 (11 percent) had a normative
component.112
1. Overview ofDoctrinal/Non-DoctrinalDistinction
The large number of doctrinal scholarship pieces in the interval study
prohibits some analyses even if we coded all scholarship into either

no
III

SD = 1.57; SD = 1.74.
M = 1.92; M = 0.63.

112
As explained in the context of the core study, our classification of type of scholarship focused on
the primary or more prevalent approach used in the scholarship but recognized the potential for multiple and
often overlapping approaches in any particular piece of scholarship.

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

2011]

39

doctrinal or non-doctrinal." 3 ANOVA analyses found that doctrinal
scholarship appears marginally more often in longer case opinions and
case opinions citing marginally more cases."'
Cases with fewer
(p < .001). 15
scholarship
to
feature
doctrinal
defendants are more likely
These findings all confirm results from the core study. However, as
opposed to the findings in the core study, cases with corporate defendants
are not more likely to feature doctrinal scholarship (p = .453).
More recent opinions were significantly more likely to cite normative
scholarship (p < .01). This effect is likely due to an outlier year, 1986,
where "only" 71 percent of scholarship cited (17 of 24) was doctrinal."'
No other year had less than 90 percent of cited scholarship classified as
doctrinal.
Again, doctrinal scholarship was more likely to be cited across all
motions considered by the court, but motions for preliminary injunctions
were significantly less likely to cite doctrinal scholarship (only 61 percent
did (11 of 18)), as compared to the overall (93 percent average) (p < .01).
In addition, 70 percent of opinions resolving motions to dismiss all claims
featured doctrinal scholarship. These findings are particularly notable
because non-doctrinal scholarship appeared only in cases focused on these
types of motions. They also support the data in the core study suggesting
that cases involving motions to dismiss rely more heavily on academic
scholarship." 7
Across the causes of action, non-doctrinal articles were significantly
more likely to appear in cases focused on fraud or mismanagement (50
Accordingly, these analyses will include the F-values as well as the p-values for better
interpretation of the results. However, for additional detailed findings included F-values and effect sizes,
interested readers are encouraged to contact the authors.
114
F (1, 148) = 3 .13 , p = .078; F (1, 148) = 3 .4 3, p = .066.
113
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F (1, 146) = 12.71.

Similar to 2006 discussed in the core study, the Delaware courts addressed several complex cases
in 1986 that might account for the reliance on more non-doctrinal scholarship. See supra note 68. For
example, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986) and the Delaware Chancery Court decided Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d
584 (Del. Ch. 1986), and Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). Each of these cases
involved complex fiduciary duty issues and, in each of these cases, the court cited academic scholarship. See,
e.g., Katz, 508 A.2d at 879 (Chancellor Allen discusses the fiduciary duty ofdirectors to pursue the objectives of
shareholders and questions whether that pursuit is really done "at the expense" of bondholders, noting the
"deeper implications of consent in the establishment of legal norms and citing new academic articles) (citing
Richard Posner, The Ethical and PoliticalBasis ofthe Eficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 487 (1980); Robin West, Authority,Autonomy and Choi: The Rule ofConsent in the Moral and Political Vision
ofFranzKajka and RichardPosner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985)).
116
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See supra Parts IV.B.1-2.
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percent, four of eight were non-doctrinal) (p < .001). However, no effect
emerged regarding breach of contract cases, as it did in the core study.
There were also no significant trends regarding the author of the opinion.
2. Source of Scholarship
Regarding the type of publication, sixteen (11 percent) came from a
general university law review or journal, seven (5 percent) from a
specialized university law review orjournal, three (2 percent) from a nonuniversity legal journal or periodical, ninety (60 percent) from a treatise,
five (3 percent) from a textbook, eleven (7 percent) from educational
materials (e.g., ALI-ABA course materials) and eighteen (12 percent) from
a Restatement. These numbers are fairly consistent with the core study
findings, with a greater reliance on treatises and a lesser reliance on
textbooks in the interval study.
Although treatises are cited significantly more often than any other
type of scholarship, this is particularly true within opinions issued after
trial (27 (77 percent) are treatises) and in non-motion case decisions (eight
(73 percent) are treatises). Treatises were cited in agreement with the
opinion's decision less in the interval study (in 71 percent of cases citing a
treatise) as compared to the core study (in 92 percent of cases citing a
treatise)."' Type of scholarship did not have a significant effect regarding
the cause of action (p = .103), but, as in the core study, breach of contract
cases cited treatises or Restatements almost exclusively.'19
As in the core study, specialized university law reviews and journals
and general university law reviews and journals were significantly more
likely to appear in longer cases (p < .001) and cases citing more cases
overall (p < .01), as compared to any other publication type. Nonuniversity business journals and periodicals were more likely to be cited in
cases with a larger number of plaintiffs (p < .01), while non-university
journals and periodicals were more likely to be cited in cases with a larger
number of defendants (p < .001).
3. Doctrinal Versus Normative Articles
As in the core study, general university law reviews or journals were
significantly more likely to be normative (p < .001) (44 percent were
No effect of publication type emerged regarding who brought the pleading.
Breach of contract cases cited a treatise ten times, a Restatement four times, and educational
materials one time.
'
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primarily normative). No other type of publication provided more than
one primarily non-doctrinal piece of scholarship. This heavy reliance
again focused on the use of treatises and Restatements. To split up the
pieces of scholarship into the doctrinal article, non-doctrinal article,
doctrinal non-article, and non-doctrinal non-article categories from the
core study would not provide sufficient sample size for interpretable
results. However, the results thus far in the interval study offer support
for the core study finding that case opinions in more recent years are
more likely to include non-doctrinal pieces of scholarship, again good
news for academics seeking to offer legal academia more normative works.
4. Author of Scholarship
We additionally sought to examine not only what the courts cite, but
whom they cite. Of the 150 pieces of scholarship, 93 of the scholarship
pieces had discernible authors. Of these, two (2 percent) were written by
assistant professors, one (1 percent) by associate professors, 13 (14
percent) by full professors, 31 (33 percent) by full named or chaired
professors, seven (8 percent) by law students, three (3 percent) by a
lawyer-associate, 26 (28 percent) by a lawyer-partner, three (3 percent) by
a judge, and two (2 percent) by a lawyer-unspecified. While the core
study favored lawyer-partners over all other groups, the interval study
preferred more established professors and lawyers.
The interval study confirmed the core study results regarding author
tenure. While three (100 percent) pieces of scholarship written by
assistant and associate professors were non-doctrinal, only two (5 percent)
of the cited pieces written by full professors and full named or chaired
professors were non-doctrinal. This is an even stronger finding than in
the core study.
To better understand these variations, we created a new author
variable that separated academic (assistant, associate, full, named
professors) from practitioner (lawyer, judge) authors. A third category was
created for the law student and "other" authors. As opposed to the core
study results, type of author did not significantly predict scholarship type
(p = .393). However, as shown in Table 3, there is a noticeable trend of
increasing academic authorship over time, with the exception of 1995.120
This trend is particularly noticeable in 1986, where 56 percent of articles
were written by academic authors, while only 19 percent were written by

120

See ina Table 3.
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legal authors. The remaining 25 percent were either from law students or
authors who fit neither category.
Table 3. Academic and Practitioner Authored Articles Over Time
10

C

U

Year

As in the core study, opinions citing pieces by academic authors
involved more defendants than opinions citing legal practitioner authors
(p < .01).121 It might be that more complex cases with more defendants
require the opinion writers to search through more academic articles and
go beyond the usual suspects of academia and legal practitioners. Still,
there was only a marginal effect of author on length of case opinion (p =
.071) and no effect on the number of plaintiffs (p = .23) or the total
number of cases cited (p = .23).
The core study found that pieces by academic authors were less used
when the defendant was a corporation, but this effect was not significant
in the interval study. However, opinions focused on motions for
preliminary injunctions were significantly less likely to cite academic
authors, as compared to other types of motions (38 percent of scholarship
in these opinions came from academics, 38 percent from legal
121

M = 5.51, SD = 6.78; M = 476, SD = 3.99.
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practitioners, and 25 percent from those outside either category (p <
.01)). Final case decision (for whom) did not correspond with authorship
of the scholarship (p = .25), as it did in the core study. Opinions with
motions granted in full were marginally more likely to cite scholarship by
legal practitioners (p = .07), and motions granted in part and denied in
part were significantly more likely to cite scholarship by academic authors
(p < .05). It could be that more difficult cases with more complex
decisions are more likely to rely on academic scholarship.
E. Results ofJudges' Surey
To better understand the opinions and experiences of the Delaware
judiciary, we first present the frequency results of the survey in order. We
then explore these results to determine whether the respondent's
experience impact the answers.
When asked if they cite academic scholarship in their judicial
opinions, five (25 percent) judges stated they did not, while seven (35
percent) stated they did in 10 percent or fewer of cases, seven (35 percent)
stated they did in 11-50 percent of cases, and one (5 percent) stated he or
she did in 51-75 percent of cases.12 Whe1 asked if they rely on academic
scholarship to reach holdings, seven (35 percent) judges said they did not,
while eight (40 percent) said they did in 10 percent or fewer of cases, and
five (25 percent) said they did in 11-50 percent of cases.
Slightly more (sixteen or 80 percent) judges stated they consulted
academic scholarship in researching or considering legal issues than those
who stated they cited academic scholarship (fifteen or 75 percent), or
relied on academic scholarship to reach holdings (thirteen or 65 percent).
Of these, eight (40 percent) stated they consulted academic scholarship in
10 percent or fewer of cases, five (25 percent) in 11-50 percent of cases,
one (5 percent) in 51-75 percent of cases, and two (10 percent) in more
than 75 percent of cases.'
When asked if their citation or use of academic scholarship has
changed over time, fifteen (75 percent) of respondents reported no

122
A significant effect emerged such that those who have served less time on the bench cite
academic scholarship less frequently (p < .05). A significant effect also emerged regarding secondary
use of scholarship, such that more experienced judges are more likely to use academic scholarship to
provide support for a new legal standard (p < .05).
123
When asked to identify a prmary reference source (other than case law, statutes, or controlling
authority), nine (45%) chose Restatements, two (10%) chose practitioner-written articles, one (5%) chose
judge-written articles, four (20%) chose academic-written articles, and four (20%) chose none of the above.
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material change, while three (15 percent) reported increased usage, and
one (5 percent) reported decreased usage. One (5 percent) did not
answer.
1. How and Why ScholarshipIs Used
The survey sought to identify how judges identify relevant
scholarship. In response to this question, five (25 percent) of respondents
said the primary source was their own research, ten (50 percent) stated it
was in research by their law clerks, two (10 percent) said it stemmed from
briefs submitted by the parties, and two (10 percent) reiterated that they
did not use academic scholarship. 2 4 It also asked judges to identify their
primary purpose for citing scholarship. In response to this question, nine
(45 percent) stated it is to provide background on legal issues raised in the
case, four (20 percent) stated it explains existing legal standards applicable
to substantive legal issues, three (15 percent) stated it provides support for
resolving a split in judicial authority, and one (5 percent) stated it provides
support to create a new legal standard.125 The indication that judges use
academic scholarship for background or informative purposes
corresponds to the data in the core study suggesting that general
university law reviews were more likely to be cited in the context of the
opinion writer neither agreeing, nor disagreeing with the cited

proposition.126
The survey then provided respondents with different types of
academic scholarship, and respondents identified sources that would be
considered "most helpful." Three (15 percent) selected scholarship that
primarily explains existing legal standards, ten (50 percent) selected
scholarship that explains existing legal standards and then analyses and
raises issues with those standards, seven (35 percent) selected comparative
scholarship, seven (35 percent) selected scholarship with a historical
analysis of legal issues, three (15 percent) selected empirical scholarship,
two (10 percent) selected scholarship that analyzes existing legal standards
One (5%) did not answer. When asked the sawndary source of academic scholarship, six (30 %)
stated their own research, five (25%) said research by law clerks, one (5%) stated discussion with academics on
legal issues, and five (25%) stated briefs submitted by the parties. Again, two (10%) re-iterated they did not use
scholarship and one (5%) did not answer.
125
Three (15%) stated they did not use academic scholarship. When asked to identify a secondary
purpose, six (30%) stated it provides background, six (30%) stated it explains existing legal standards, two
(10%) stated it provides support to resolve a split, two (10%) stated it provides support to create a new legal
standard, and two (10%) stated they do not use academic scholarship.
126
Sw supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124
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but primarily discusses alternatives to those standards, one (5 percent)
selected scholarship primarily discussing legal theory, one (5 percent)
selected interdisciplinary scholarship, and three (15 percent) found none
of these types helpful. These results correspond to the data in the core
study suggesting that courts invoke primarily doctrinal scholarship or
doctrinal scholarship with a normative component. 127
2. The Decision to Consult
When asked what factors affect the decision to consult academic
scholarship, nine (45 percent) selected the tenure and reputation of the
author, five (25 percent) selected solely the reputation of the author, ten
(50 percent) selected the reputation of the source, and seven (35 percent)
hen asked what factors affect the
selected none of these factors.128
decision to consult practitioner scholarship, five (25 percent) selected the
position (e.g. partner, of counsel) and reputation of the author, five (25
percent) selected solely the reputation of the author, eight (40 percent)
selected the reputation of the source, and nine (45 percent) selected none
of these factors. Notably, the judges' survey suggests a greater emphasis
on source reputation than the data in the core study. 129 Nevertheless,
consistent with the core study, author tenure/position and reputation are
important factors.' 30 This slight difference may suggest disagreement
between sources viewed as reputable by the bench and bar and those
viewed in a similar vein by academics."'
Thirteen (65 percent) of respondents stated that they did not find
articles written by practitioners more useful than those written by
academics. However, those who stated they did find practitioner articles
to be more useful stated such things as "often, academic articles are
written for other academics rather than for the legal profession generally"
and that practitioner articles are "more likely to focus on [the] issue at
127

See supra Part W.B.

128

Interestingly, post-hoc analyses revealed that judges who have served less time on the bench are
more likely to consider the reputation of the author and the publication source in deciding whether to cite
scholarship.
129
130

See supraPart IV.B.2.
See supra Part IV.B.4.

Similarly, disagreement may exist regarding what constitutes quality or relevant scholarship. For a
thoughtful and interesting study of the reputational value of corporate scholarship citations, see Peter B. Oh,
TakingEmpiricalStock ofte Best Coorateand SecunritiesArtcles (Univ. ofPittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper
httpV/papers.ssrn.com/soL3/
available at
2009),
2009-16,
No.
Paper
Working
Series,
papers.cfm?abstract id= 1400238.
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hand" and be "less esoteric and theoretical."' 3 2 The sentiments expressed
by the judges in the survey may support the general conclusion above
regarding differences in sources viewed as reputable by judges versus
academics.'
Twelve (60 percent) of respondents stated that they did not find
articles published by specialty law reviews or journals more useful than
those in general law reviews or journals. Those who did find specialty law
reviews or journals more useful said this is because they "are more
timely," "assist in addressing specific application," and have a "more in
depth and relevant" discussion.'3 4 The judges' statements in support of
using specialty law reviews correspond to the data in the core study
suggesting that such law reviews were cited in cases dealing with internal
affairs issues, which generally include corporate governance and
stakeholder disputes that can raise very timely and complex legal issues."'
Finally, seventeen (85 percent) of respondents stated they did not use
academic scholarship any differently in business law cases than in other
opinions. One respondent who stated otherwise said it is because
"business law cases tend to present more cutting edge issues." 3 6
3. Business Law Issues on Courts' Dockets
Four (20 percent) of those surveyed reported that none of the cases on
their docket involve business law issues. Of the 80 percent who do hear
business law cases, six (30 percent) hear these issues in 10 percent or
fewer cases, eight (40 percent) in 11-50 percent of cases and two (10
percent) in 75 percent or more cases.137
A significant effect emerged regarding the identification of academic
scholarship by law clerks for the respondents' purpose, such that law
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13
134
135
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Judges' Suney (on file with authors).
See supra Part IV.B2.
judg' Suney (on file with authors).
SeesupraPartlV.B2.

Judges' Suney (on file with authors).

m
Most cases involving business law issues in Delaware are decided by the Delaware Supreme
Court, the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the Delaware Superior Court. See supra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text. This description of the Delaware courts corresponds to the cases in the study database.
For example, in the core study, 124 (62 percent) case opinions were from the Court of Chancery- New
Castle, with 20 (10%) from the Superior Court of Delaware- New Castle, 17 (9%) from the Supreme Court
of Delaware, 11 (6%) from the Superior Court of Delaware-Kent, 9 (5%) from the Court of ChancerySussex, 8 (4%) each from the Court of Chancery-Kent and Court of Common Pleas of Delaware, 2 (1%)
from the Superior Court of Delaware-Kent, and 1 (0.5%) from the Court of Common Pleas-Sussex
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clerks are more likely to identify academic scholarship for judges with a
lower percentage of business law issues on the docket. Thus, academic
scholarship might be seen as more relevant and helpful to law clerks on
non-business issues, warranting future research. A significant effect also
emerged where judges with 75 percent or more business law cases are
most likely to see academic scholarship through submitted briefs, those
judges with no business law issues, or 11-50 percent of cases with
business law issues, are most likely to identify academic scholarship
through law clerks' research and those judges with 10 percent or less of
cases with business law issues are evenly likely to identify relevant
scholarship through law clerks or their own research (p < .01).
No overall effects emerged regarding the factors affecting the decision
to consult academic or practitioner scholarship. However, post-hoc
analyses regarding the use of practitioner scholarship found that those
who see business issues in 11-50 percent of their cases are significantly
more likely to rely on the position (e.g. partner, of counsel) and
reputation of the author (p < .05) than those who see business law issues
in 75 percent or more of their cases.

V. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Overall, the data contain good and bad news for corporate scholars.
On the one hand, the data show no general downward trend in the courts'
use of legal scholarship in the business law context. This is particularly
good news given prior studies that suggest at least some usage decline.'
On the other hand, the number of judicial decisions invoking legal
scholarship is remarkably small. As discussed above, only 46 percent of
the cases in the core study database cite any legal scholarship, and only 13
percent cite academic scholarship.'13
Moving beyond citation counts, the data produce useful information
regarding when and how courts use legal scholarship." This information
highlights factors that may help scholars better understand when courts
find it helpful to use academic scholarship as opposed to purely doctrinal
sources, such as treatises and Restatements. For example, academic
scholarship is cited more frequently in longer opinions that involve more
parties, review more extensive case law, and result in an "in part" decision
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esupra Part U.
See supra Part IVAla.
See supra note 26 (discussing weaknesses in citation studies).
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(i.e., finding only in part for the moving party).14' A reasonable inference
from this data is that courts rely on academic scholarship in more complex
litigation. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that courts cite
more academic scholarship in the motion to dismiss context, which often
involves disputed governance issues between the corporation, its board
and its shareholders.142 These cases can raise both complex and novel
issues that would compel a judge to look beyond the applicable treatise.143
Similarly, the data suggesting that courts turn to specialty law reviews
in these types of complex, corporate governance cases underscore the
motivation of courts using academic scholarship when a doctrinal
recitation of applicable law is insufficient.'" As with the prior study
performed by Lawless and David in the bankruptcy context, the courts'
use of specialty law reviews in business law cases is likely enhanced by the
number of specialty law reviews devoted to business law issues.1'
Notably, the data does not suggest a move by courts addressing business
law issues to specialty law reviews in lieu of general law reviews (or any
other type of scholarship for that matter).
Although the data from the judges' survey largely complements the
data from the core study, some of the narrative responses suggest a
lingering concern that academic scholarship is disconnected from the
issues raised in practice.146 The courts' willingness to use scholarship in
certain circumstances, however, indicates a continuing role for scholars
who wish to write for that audience. In fact, the growing presence of
specialty law reviews may assist these scholars because judges who have
observed a disconnect between academic and practical work also noted the
contribution of specialty law reviews to the discipline.147 This inference
likely confirms the existing suspicion of scholars who target publication in
specialty law reviews for that very reason.
Another noteworthy observation is the relation between the data in
the judges' survey indicating judges' willingness to consult academic
scholarship, even if they do not cite it in the resulting opinion, and the
data in the core study showing citation to academic scholarship in a

SeesupraPartW.B.2.
Seesupra Part iV.B2.
"
See also supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the increased citation of scholarship in
2006 and the corresponding complex nature ofthe business litigation decided by Delaware courts that year).
144
See supra Part I.B.4.
145
See Lawless & David, supra note 5, at 523-24.
M
See supra Part IVIE.
1'
SeesupraPartV.E
141
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neutral context.14 ' The realization that courts are not frequently relying
on academic scholarship to reach their holdings may be disheartening for
some scholars, but it does evidence the informative role that academic
scholarship can play. 149 The court may not necessarily agree with the
conclusion or proposal of the scholar, but the reasoning and analysis
contained in the article may still inform the court's decision.
CONCLUSION

Overall, our data suggest that courts addressing primarily business law
issues do reference academic scholarship, but they do so selectively and on
an as-needed basis. This finding is consistent with the following general
observation by judge Thomas Ambro:
When do [judges] want help from an article? The answer:
when an issue is difficult. The desire for "outside" help becomes
altogether acute when the briefs underperform. It is here that
articles often give the best guideposts for decision. But even
assuming the briefs (including those of amici curiae counsel) are
well-crafted, tough issues come freighted with doubt. To dispel
that doubt, we leave no reputable source of information
unreviewed.so
Moreover, our data did not detect any declining trends in the courts'
use of scholarship over either the ten-year period included in the core
study or the forty year period included in the interval study. This finding
may relate in part to the somewhat controlled nature of the types of
disputes included in the study and, as a result, the nature and scope of
secondary sources relevant to those disputes. It also may stem from the
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See supra Parts IV.B.2, I.E.
This data also correspond with anecdotal evidence that Delaware courts are in touch with
academic scholarship and positions articulated by corporate scholars. For example, in Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009), the Delaware Supreme Court held that corporate officers
owe the same fiduciary duties to shareholders as corporate directors. This position was strongly
endorsed by Professors Lyman Johnson and David Millon in several articles pre-dating the Gander
decision. See, e.g., Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601-02 (2005); see also Usha Rodrigues, Posting to DelawareSupreme
Court: Ofcers Are Fiduciaries, The Conglomerate (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2009/01/delaware-supreme-court-officers-are-fiduciaries.html (suggesting that the Gantler decision
vindicated the work of Professors Johnson and Millon).
15
Ambro, supra note 48, at 549.
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small and relatively constant group of judges issuing the decisions.
Notably, these judges appear to be relying on academic scholarship more
frequently as the issues they face become increasingly more novel and
complex.
Although interesting, the results of the study may not be surprising to
those who research and write in the corporate law discipline. As disclosed
above, our primary hypothesis was based in part on the knowledge that
corporate scholars can and do target a fairly identifiable bench and bar in
their scholarship and have done so with some success.' 1 Nevertheless,
the study confirms those suspicions and uncovers factors that influence
the courts' use of scholarship. In addition, the data suggest that the
courts' use of scholarship in other specialized disciplines may not or need
not follow the downward trend of general citation studies, warranting
additional research.
Corporate scholars who desire to influence decisional law should not
be discouraged by general citation studies. Many cutting-edge issuesi.e., issues that make for interesting scholarship and likely would
encourage a judge to turn to secondary sources-arise in the Delaware
state courts or one of the several other states that have specialized business
courts. Moreover, given the recurring corporate scandals and everincreasing complexity of the global business economy, the trend toward
more complex business law cases and, in turn, greater reliance on
academic scholarship evidenced by the study likely will continue. In fact,
the landscape appears to be primed for more meaningful collaboration
among all involved in the corporate law discipline.
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See supra Part H.

